Abstract: Is the existence of the nation-state responsible for freer societies and a decrease in violence? By looking at Somalia pre-anarchy and Somalia post-anarchy allows one to do a compare and contrast to see if things improved in the state's absence. Failures of exporting democracy and imposing law from above reveals how culture and social norms are a greater influence on people's behavior and the type of society one lives under than government legislation. The law in the West, often considered a paragon of justice and freedom was not a creation of the state, but arose spontaneously. Commercial, merchant, and the common law arouse privately. The rule of law is not a state creation, but a result of spontaneous order that arose in order for people to engage in reciprocity and live well with each other.
I. Introduction
For many, law and government are synonyms and that you can't have one without the other. To argue against the existence of government is often presumed to argue against the existence of law. Lon Fuller defines law as, "a direction of purposive human effort, consists in the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules" (Fuller 1964, 30) . Max Weber defines a government or state as an institution that holds a legitimized monopolization of force within a given territorial area (Weber 1968, 54) . Anarchy is the absence of a state. Based on such definitions, law and government are separate. Laws are the rules of the game, and government is an institution that can enforce them. Just like food and supermarkets are not synonyms, neither are laws and governments. Therefore, government is the monopolization of law, and anarchy is the polycentric development of law. A society without a state is not necessarily a society without laws, but a society without a monopoly rulemaking enforcer.
There are many reasons to oppose the government and instead prefer a polycentric legal system. One is that competition is preferable to uniformity. Another reason is that since the government gets guaranteed revenue by a compulsory levy known as taxation, as well as being able to forcibly prevent competition the government is not bound by satisfying the needs of the people. If a person does not have to compete and gets a guaranteed income there is less of an incentive to do well than if one had to persuade people to buy their services. The reason that the market is superior to the state is because the market has competition where firms have to persuade people to hand over their money, whereas the government can forcibly expropriate it. If the government can force people to hand over their money irrespective of job performance the government has less of an incentive to provide a good job then if getting money from people was not a guarantee, but based on providing a more valuable service than the money one chooses to fork over. The type of social organization I am advocating for is referred to as anarchocapitalism, where courts, police, and money is determined by market forces, not politics. I want to privatize everything. Just like schools, food, healthcare, and automobiles increase in quality when they are supplied by the market, so too does protection services. I advocate a polycentric legal system, where the market determines law, not legislative bodies.
The purpose of this paper is to defend my case for why a stateless society is superior to one with a government. Before going over the empirical evidence to show how law has existed in the absence of a state originally and in certain areas still does, it is first necessary to go over the methodology on how to answer: Is the existence of the nation-state responsible for a free society?
In order to be able to answer the question of whether the state is both superior and necessary to a society without one, it is first necessary to address the issue in how freedom is maximized. Freedom (or liberty) refers to doing what one wants with one's person and property as long as one does not violate the person and/or property of others. Liberty is not messing with other people's stuff. Daniel Klein rejects the axiom view of liberty which says that direct liberty should never be violated, and instead takes the maxim view of liberty, which is that by and large direct liberty should never be violated. Usually there is not a tension between direct liberty and overall liberty, but there maybe cases where there are. When there is a tension between direct and overall liberty, Daniel Klein says that the liberty principle should advocate for whichever is more liberty augmenting. According to Daniel Klein, "The liberty principle says: In a choice between a pair of policy reforms (one of which may be no reform at all), the reform that ranks higher in liberty is more desirable" (Klein 2012, 245) . Daniel Klein says that what constitutes such an outlook is the liberty maxim, which is that by and large the liberty principle holds.
Instead of taking a 100% rule of coercion is never justified, Daniel Klein advocates for a presumption of liberty. According to Klein, "that presumption places the burden of proof on those who would favor the less-liberty choice" (Klein 2012, 246) . Klein stresses that just because a principle does not work 100% of the time does not mean it should be rejected for a principle that vainly tries to be applicable in all cases. By and large is sufficient. Daniel Klein's presumption of liberty is a good rule of thumb. Don't commit coercion unless there is a common sense reason for doing so. If there is a way to solve an issue without a violation of direct liberty, the peaceful alternative should be chosen instead. I accept Daniel where the only way to get people to remove water from the lifeboat is pointing a gun at them (he also mentions stealing a car in order to drive someone who is about to die to the hospital).
Huemer says, "Your entitlement to coerce is highly specific and content-dependent: it depends upon your having a correct (or at least well-justified) plan for saving the boat, and you may coerce others only to induce cooperation with that plan. More precisely, you must at least be justified in believing that the expected benefits of coercively imposing your plan on the others are very large and much larger than the expected harms. You may not coerce others to induce harmful or useless behaviors or behaviors designed to serve ulterior purposes unrelated to the emergency. For instance, if you display your firearm and order everyone to start scooping water into the boat, you are acting wrongly -and similarly if you use the weapon to force the others to pray to Poseidon, lash themselves with belt, or hand over $50 to your friend Sally…If, therefore, we rely upon cases like this to account for the state's right to coerce or violate the property rights of its citizens, the proper conclusion is that the state's legitimate powers must be highly specific and content-dependent" (Huemer 2013, 94-95) . Huemer also mentions that such a scenario fails to justify political authority since a government, as stated above, is a monopolization of the use of force. If there are certain situations were "sometimes coercion is our friend" (Klein & Clark 2012, 134) , then why does it matter who does the coercion? If there are certain situations where coercion is justified in order to increase overall liberty it is based on the situation, not on who does it. Klein (at least on his paper on overall vs. direct liberty) has not justified the nightwatchman state. Klein has done an excellent job arguing for why coercion may be justified in certain cases, but not why it is licit for the state to use force in areas where it would be illicit to for others to do so. If there are certain situations where it may be justified to steal bread why is it justified for government to steal the bread, but not someone else? What is the reason it is okay for A to coerce B, but no one else to coerce B? The situation ought to determine when coercion is justified, not who is doing the coercing. If there are certain situations where coercion is justified, it is justified for anyone, not just the government. Therefore, the presumption of liberty far from justifying the existence of monopoly enforcement over polycentric law has only justified certain cases where coercion is justified.
Perhaps the reply will be that the reason the government should be able to use force where it would be illegal for anyone else to do so is that the liberty principle would increase if only government is given this unique power. It is this question that my paper will explore. Now onto the methodology.
II. Methodology
One of the most comprehensive studies for why violence has decreased was done by Steven Pinker in his mammoth tome, The Better Angels of Our Nature. Steven Pinker does not attribute the decline of violence solely to the existence of the nation-state. Rather, the nationstate is one reason among others that accounts for the decline of homicide per capita. An increase in commerce and an increase on the use of reason are also contributing factors. Pinker discusses the "the Flynn effect," which is where people today are given the same IQ test as in generations past. James Flynn studied IQ scores throughout different regions of the world and the results were the same everywhere: IQ has increased throughout the 20 th century everywhere. According today's cars better because of government regulation or in spite of government regulation? So too, is the decline of violence because of the existence of the nation-state or in spite of the existence of the nation-state? Simply saying there is less violence now than then is not sufficient to answer such a question.
As the above graph shows, out of the five countries, England has the lowest homicide rate. There has been a major decline in violence in England starting in the mid-1500s and has been declining since. What is interesting about the above graph is that from the 1500s until the mid-1800s, policing has been mostly a responsibility of private individuals. It wasn't until 1737 where taxes were used to pay for public police when King George II used taxpayer money to hire watchman (Benson 1990, 74) . However public, government control of policemen was not introduced in London until 1829 when Robert Peel introduced the Metropolitan Police Act, a bill which Parliament passed in 1829, establishing the first modern police force in England (Benson 1990, 74 ). Yet parts of London still had a private police force. The nationalization, nationwide police force in London was created in 1856 (Koyama 2012, 15 From the 10 th to 13 th centuries, Iceland's legal system was totally privatized, and developed without any central authority. The laws were made by a "parliament," in which the seats of the legislature were held by the owners of the boroughs, or by men chosen by them (Friedman 1979, 401) . Such chieftains were known as goooros, and they presided over groups of men that agreed to follow them, and be members of that congregation. Every man was part of a congregation and could name his chief, and could change congregations at any time. This ability to become elected to legislature by leading a congregation became "a marketable property" that could be "given away, sold, held by a partnership, inherited, or whatever" (Friedman 1979, 405) .
During this time, many of the inhabitants of Iceland came from Norway, after deciding to leave King Harald Fairhair's rule. The laws and "political" system that developed were based on
Norwegian traditions and the Anglo-Saxton common law. There were no crimes against society, only crimes against individuals. There was no executive body and no prosecuting attorney by the state. Prosecution was the responsibility of the individuals harmed or their heirs. When a conflict arose there were private courts where half of the members of the court were chosen by the plaintiff and half by the defendant (Friedman 1979, 404) . If the verdict ruled against the defendant, it was up to him to pay the assigned punishment, which was almost always a fine. If he did not pay the fine he was considered an outlaw. People declared to be an outlaw were unable to be sheltered and those who did shelter an outlaw could be prosecuted for doing so.
A possible objection to private law enforcement is that it would favor the wealthy, and poor people who could not afford protection would be left defenseless. The Icelandic system of law enforcement had a way to solve this problem by having transferable tort claims. If one did not want to seek out damages himself he could sell his tort claim to someone else and that person would be able to seek out damages on his behalf (Friedman 1979, 406) . Such a system allows those who are too weak or too poor to sell their torts to those who are more willing and able to seek justice on their behalf. Suppose a victim had no heirs, would he then be stuck and a murderer would get away scot-free? No, instead a person was able to homestead the tort claim and seek justice on behalf of the murdered victim. Transferable tort claims allow those who lack friends and heirs to get justice done by strangers who if lacking empathy, have now a financial incentive to seek damages against others and punish violators.
One reason medieval Iceland avoided perpetual civil wars and open fighting is because
people knew in advance who protected whom. People were also free to join associations that defended and collected tort claims on their behalf (Friedman 1979, 403) . It was in the selfinterest of the members of the associations to defend people who were in their coalitions since both their reputation and their safety was dependent on making sure their members were protected.
During the three hundred years that Iceland lived in a state of anarchy crime was relatively low. Rape and torture were uncommon; the killing of women almost unheard of.
Friedman suggests that even during the worst fifty years of civil war that almost brought an end to the Icelandic system the number of people killed on a per capita basis then was roughly equal to the current rate of murder in the United States (Friedman 1979, 410 The commercial law that exists today was not created by government, but arose privately.
Commercial law arose in defiance of government. Merchants who wanted to trade internationally had to abide by countless government laws, making trading more difficult. There were also contradictory laws, making it difficult to conduct business outside of their own government.
Merchant law arose in order to have more uniform laws governing international trade. The market can provide diversity when it is necessary, like in the numerous types of deodorant
Bernie Sanders complains about, and uniformity when it is demanded, like in the case of videocassette players all adopting to VHS over Betamax. In the case of international trade, what were needed were uniform laws, which governments were unable to provide. The market filled the void that government both caused and was unable to fix.
During the 11 th and 12 th centuries there was a rapid expansion in agricultural activity.
Because of the increased expansion in productivity, less labor was needed to go into farming in order to feed people, which resulted in an increased demand for labor in other areas. The increased productivity of farming led to increased trade and a merchant class to better facilitate trade. Different languages, laws, customs, and geographic distances frequently prevented direct communication, making the trust necessary to engage in trade difficult. What was needed to engage in trust and trade was a market and law that acted as a "language of interaction" (Benson 1989, 646) . Such commercial, private law that arose was not based on arbitrary rules, but largely based on Roman commercial law. However, much of the Roman law that was passed down through generations was not sufficient to meet the new problems that arose during the commercial revolution (Benson 1989, 647) . This meant that the merchants themselves created the law that the merchants needed to better engage in commercial transactions.
Merchants developed their own court system for several reasons. Government courts would not honor any contract that involved paying interest since the royal courts considered interest a form of usury. Government courts in one country would often not uphold contracts made under the laws of another country, making international trade difficult. As Benson points out, "common-law courts would not consider books of accounts as evidence, despite the fact that merchants held such records in high regard" (Benson 1989, 650) . Another reason for merchant courts is that the judges on state courts lacked the technical knowledge relevant to international trade. Since such judges and lawyers lacked the knowledge of how trading works, they would often enact highly complex and punitive laws which were more a hindrance than a help.
In order to make sure that the merchants from different regions would respect each other's decisions, the merchant law that was developed was made to increase trust and reciprocity. Credit instruments were developed during this time in order to make trade easier. In order to ensure trust, fraud was forbidden. Part of reciprocity involves not favoring one side more than another. A contract that is heavily one sided, like the mystical social contact, is not considered a valid contract since no person would voluntarily agree to a contract that imposed all the obligations on him and all the benefit onto another person. Merchant's notions of fairness and fraud were based on customs. Different merchants from different regions brought their customs and norms with them and through a process of trial, error and competition, those customs that were shown to be the most efficient were adopted and those customs which were not beneficial to both parties were weeded out (Benson 1990, 32) .
Rules of evidence and procedures were simplified, appeals were forbidden to avoid unnecessary delays, lengthy testimony under oath was avoided; debts were freely transferable through informal 'written obligatory,' a process developed by merchants to simplify the transfer of debts; actions by agents in transactions were considered valid without formal authority; and ownership transfers were recognized without physical delivery (Benson 1990, 34 ). All of these legal innovations were adopted by merchant courts to better facilitate trade and ensure trust.
To ensure that the merchant court decisions were fulfilled, boycotts and ostracism were used against merchants that refused to agree to the courts' verdict. Since merchant law required reciprocal arrangements, to get voluntary agreement and to increase trust, the laws that developed were based on individual rights (Benson 1990, 36 Fortunately, to prevent totally bloody war and chaos, the border inhabitants' interactions led to a decentralized system that gave rise to customary rules known as "leges marchiarum Theft was considered a violation of the law of the marches and the punishment for theft was double the amount of damages. The "two teeth for a tooth" as Walter Block often refers to it, was a part of common law and the law code of medieval Iceland as well.
While the law of the marches did not totally reduce violence, the decentralized Leges Marchiarum worked in reducing the hostilities that existed before such rules developed. The mere presence of such rules reduced mistrust between the opposing borderers by specifying which acts were considered legitimate and which were considered illegitimate and punishable.
The day of truce also reduced the expected benefit of engaging in violence-by having to pay compensation-and reduced the cost of being victimized (Leeson 2009, 494 Under the Somalian government, the only way to own land was to get permission from the state.
In the 1980s the land ceased to be nationalized and was "privatized" by being given to those with political clout. Most of the government's budget went to the military, while less than 1% went to social services (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh 2008, 659) . Since the public sector failed to provide goods and services to the people, black markets arose to fill in the void. The black markets were able to provide healthcare, education, and investment credit to people.
After 
VI. Why Do Most Nations Fail and Why Has Exporting Democracy Abroad Failed?
The great economist Thomas Sowell once asked, not why are so many people poor, but why are so few able to become rich? For most people in the world, freedom is not the norm. The vast majority of the population does not have access to many of the things Western societies take for granted. If the nation-state is truly what leads to an increase in freedom, then why don't most nation-states exhibit these characteristics? As explained earlier, most nation-states are on the brink of collapse or in dire straits. Most nation-states have failed to provide the liberty and security they promise. Therefore, the question should not be that since some nation-states do not result in failure the solution is a nation-state, but why are some nation-states successful, while most are not? What determines how successful a nation-state will be?
While I am not so presumptuous as to have an answer on how to create a successful society, I do hope to provide some theories as to possibly explain why exporting democracy has Holcombe argues that the government is not designed to provide goods and services but to redistribute wealth. The government is described as a stationary bandit that extracts income from people and in exchange removes the roving bandits who would be even more predatory (Holcombe 2004, 329) . According to the stationary bandit model, law and order is a public good.
Primitive societies where goods were held in common were able to protect themselves, but in agrarian, individualized societies where property was not held in common there was little incentive to produce public goods, such as law and order. In a society of 1,000 people, a person only gets 1/1,000 th of the protection from producing law and order, so it would not be worth it to produce the public good himself (Klitgaard & Tinggard 2003, 256). Since there would be no property protection, people were at the mercy of others who would rob and plunder them. A roving bandit, such as the Vikings from the 8 th to the 11 th century, would come along and rob a bunch of people in a village and then wander off. Since all of the gains would go to whoever was the strongest, it was worth it to engage in predation. In order to prevent such roving bandits from continually blundering people, the people would be willing to tolerate a stationary bandit instead.
The stationary bandit would tax people, often heavily, and enforce and protect property rights. A roving bandit has a high time preference since he does not care that his stealing reduces the incentives of the people he robs from to produce. On the other hand, a stationary bandit does not want to disincentivize the looted since he will also gain a share in the future produce the looted produces. A stationary bandit has an incentive to take property from someone, but not enough to discourage him from no longer producing. A stationary bandit also views roving bandits as competition and so has an incentive to prohibit roving bandits from pillaging his citizenry since that is his job. A government is set up to act as a stationary bandit, which is less predatory than the roving bandit. A government prevents roving bandits from continually looting people and hence the people are better off under the stationary bandit than being under constant roving bandits that would take the whole produce instead of just a portion. According to Kintgaard and Tinngard, the state of medieval China has its origins as becoming a stationary bandit, which they say the people preferred (Klitgaard & Tinggard 2003, 256).
While Holcombe does not make the assumption that law and order is a public good the market won't provide, he does make the claim that in the absence of the state the other alternative is to be at the mercy of an even worse predatory gang. The real choice is not between market or government provision of public goods but between a roving gang or a stationary gang.
In the absence of a nation-state there would be a roving bandit who would be more predatory since he steals resources and moves along, without concern that doing so will cause his victims to produce less in the future. The government is like a shepherd who wants his animals to be nice and fat since they will sell more on the market that way. Having free-range humans allows humans to be more productive than they would be under constant expropriation and slavery.
The stationary bandit theory has an overly pessimistic view of anarchy and an overly optimistic view of government. The theory assumes it is in the self-interest of the bandit to loot people and that other people would be at his mercy. While such tribes came about through custom and kinship, such tribal arrangements were later adopted by the English common law system during the 10 th century. The hundreds were also divided into other groups, sometimes as small as ten men in a system known as borh (Curott & Stringham 2010, 11) . Since there was no standing army or nationalized police force, groups such as the hundred acted as a decentralized police force. People who decided to join the groups took what was known as a frankpledge, which was an oath where each group swore to both abide by the rules of the group and to protect the other members of the group when in need. In such a group, each member was responsible and looked out for the other members of the group. If one stole or committed other acts of aggression and failed to abide by the verdict he was declared an outlaw. In order to ensure cooperation and trust, many members of the tribes refused to engage in trade and exchange unless a person was a part of the surety system. If a person was unable to prove that he was a member of a coalition that could pledge on his behalf that conveyed a signal to people that such a person was untrustworthy and so had trouble joining another group for protection and engaging in trade and exchange (Liggio 1977, 273) . where each person has an incentive to want a larger share of the dollar. It is unlikely that a person will only accept 10 cents and allow the other person to keep 90 cents, and it's unlikely that a person wanting 90 cents of the dollar will believe the other person will agree to this. The likely result is that the dollar will be split in half since each person has an incentive to agree with how the dollar will be divided (in order to get it) and to maximize the amount he gets; a fiftyfifty split is the most likely scenario to make both parties as well off as possible.
Friedman talks about how peaceful resolution is more likely to occur when people agree. (Friedman 1994, 12) . Friedman says that in a world without transaction costs, any initial allocation of property rights is efficient, but in the real world with transaction costs, the most efficient allocation of property is where I own me and you own you since it is easier to enforce such rules than a society where I own other people or everyone owns a portion of everyone else.
In short, Friedman is claiming that rules tend to move in the direction that is at least locally efficient and that the rules that are most efficient (where people own themselves and what they homestead) and just are also the rules which tend to be exist in society. So rather than having a tension between what should be and what is, justice, efficiency, and the legal rules which exists complement each other.
The above explains how property rights, norms, customs, and laws emerge. The most successful laws are laws based on previous focal points. Customs and norms are not static or arbitrary but based on continuous interaction with people. The most successful interactions and behaviors are the ones that cause the norms to stick and get codified in law, as in the case of the common law. The common law was based on a case-by-case basis where whenever a conflict arose, the most efficient way to settle a dispute was the one which was written down for how to solve the dispute in the future. Through a process of trial and error, the norms that won out were those that were the most efficient at settling disputes by conforming to people's expectations.
According to legal scholar Hasnas, the common law was not legislative law, but case-by-case law. The law was about finding a result that both opposing parties found acceptable in order to resolve a dispute without violence having to be a solution (Hasnas 2008, 114) .
When the basis of law is contractual law, where the goal is mutual benefit and reciprocity, the rules that emerge are rules conforming to people's norms and expectations with each other. As shown above, these occur as a result of repeated interactions with others, not based on government edits. The law was not created by government and can exist in its absence.
Suppose that instead of a nation-state, the market provided law. (Peden 1977, 83) . Instead, in
Ireland there was contractual law where people hired people representatives to enforce contracts for them and joined in sureties for protection (Peden 19777, 86-87) .
If the United States decided to go anarchy by having the state eliminating its taxing power and allowing competition, it is reasonable to assume that such private defense agencies would protect property and to a greater degree than the government does. One major difference between the state and the market is that firms in the market are concerned with making a profit and successful firms would engage in behavior that would generate a profit. Would firms make more money by stealing and robbing from people and acting like a stationary bandit, or would they make a higher profit by protecting people and their property?
The libertarian theory of property rights is homesteading, which is first come, first serve.
The first person to be in contact with the property is the one who gets to claim ownership over it.
The idea of homesteading is not an arbitrary theory of property, but a natural one.
Related to homesteading is the endowment effect. The endowment effect is that people value the good they possess more highly than a good they do not possess. The endowment effect creates a feeling of loss aversion where people are willing to spend more resources devoted to protecting their property than others would to seize theirs. Loss aversion is when a person is more sensitive to losses than gains (Gintis 2006, 2) . Thaler explains an experiment showing the endowment effect in action. In the experiment, people were randomly assigned the role of seller, buyer, or chooser. The sellers were given a mug (that originally sold for $6 at the school store) and were asked whether they would be willing to sell the mug at prices ranging from $0.25 to $9.25. Choosers were asked to choose for each price between receiving the mug or that amount of money. The experiment revealed that the average buyer was willing to buy the mug fro $2.87 and the average seller was willing to sell the mug for $7.12. Choosers acted similarly to buyers by being on average indifferent to getting the mug or receiving $3.12. What the experiment revealed is that the owners of the mug valued the mug at more than twice the amount as nonowners (Gintis 2006, 4) . The experiment shows that once a person is currently in possession of a product he is willing to spend more money to keep it than someone who is not currently in possession of the product.
The endowment effect is not just an economic theory done in experiments, but a natural tendency among humans and animals. In one study, observers looked at a group of 11 toddlers and 13 preschools to see how often a toddler or preschooler possessed an object and how often they took the object from others. The results found that success was strongly and equally related to both how strong the person was and prior possession. The observers also found that toddlers recognize possession as a basis for asserting control rights, but do not respect the same rights in others. The preschools, more than twice the age of the toddlers, use physical proximity both to justify their own claims and to respect the claims of others (Gintis 2006, 7) . The endowment effect demonstrates that even very young children are willing to spend more energy defending what they own then they are taking others.
Stevens studied horses competing for water. The water was located in pools that would result after severe rains. What Stevens reported was that out of the 233 horses observed, 178 (80%) of the horses who were by the pool first were able to successfully ward off the horses that tried to take their spot away from them (Gintis 2006, 8) . A similar experiment showed butterflies successful warding off intruders who were in their space. Thus, even animals recognize the homesteading theory of property.
Using our knowledge of the endowment effect it would not be unreasonable to conclude that people would be willing to spend more money to defend their property and their life than spend resources to steal and hurt other people. Since market defense agencies are in the business of making a profit, it seems likely that they would make a higher profit defending people's property and life than being hired as goons to steal from others. People are willing to spend more money to defend their rights than they are to violate others. Therefore the market would tend to reward the most profit-maximizing firms, which would be those who defended persons and property.
Similar to Friedman's example with the apple grower and the lumberjack, a focal point is more likely to occur that reflects people's expectations with each other. Even in primitive societies, the taking of an object currently in possession of another individual is rare (Gintis 2006, 8) . Since most cultures and norms already have laws against theft, defense agencies that were able to fulfill people's expectations of punishing theft would be met with a good reputation, whereas agencies that looted from people would be viewed with condemnation, just like how the mafia is viewed today. Successful businesses depend on good reputations, and being fair promotes a better reputation than an agency that is going to rob and extort people.
During the Anglo-Saxon era, people were part of a surety system where they were responsible for the other members. There is no reason to believe that such a similar system would not come again. Under a polycentric legal system people joined voluntary associations that would come to their aid. In a market, there would likely be insurance agencies where people would contract out and pay for crime insurance, the same way people pay for life and health insurance. Insurance agencies suffer from an adverse selection problem. People willing to spend the most on health insurance are likely to be people who are already sick or going to be shortly, which is why insurance companies have measures to reward people for being healthy and giving lower rates to people who voluntarily take precautions. So too, people wanting to spend the most amount of money on crime insurance tells the insurance company such people are those most likely to commit crimes since why would a person unlikely to commit crimes want to spend a lot on crime insurance. Therefore in order to prevent this adverse selection problem, crime insurance companies would give lower rates for those who prove they are peaceful, have a good reputation, and signal to the insurance company that they aren't going to be committing a lot of crimes. 
IX. People Living in Older States are Worse Off Than People Living in Newer States

X. Conclusion
Western conceptions of government tend to be considered paragons of justice and 
